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Abstract  
The paper tracks the evolution of the Greek electricity market since the beginning of 
the liberalization process. Its progress is benchmarked against the criteria suggested 
by Littlechild (2006b). The Littlechild framework highlights key remaining 
deficiencies in the stances and policies adopted which need to be resolved in order for 
liberalization to proceed successfully. The focus is on the agendas of the Greek 
government, other domestic political forces and the European Union. A central 
requirement is the clear commitment to liberalization by the Greek government. In 
particular the government needs to give up political control over the previous 
vertically integrated, state-controlled electricity firm, Public Power Company (PPC), 
and allow more decision making powers and genuine independence to the market 
regulator. Liberalization is rendered more difficult by the present financial and 
economic crisis in Greece.  
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1. Introduction 
After the establishment of Public Power Company (PPC) in 1950 and its absorption of 
smaller local Greek electricity firms after 1956, the Greek electricity industry was 
organized as a vertically integrated state owned monopoly. In this monopolistic 
market PPC covered all electricity industry activities in Greece: it owned and operated 
all the infrastructure and the assets of the industry. In 1996 a decision was taken for 
the industry to proceed with liberalization. This decision came as part of a 
requirement of the European Union, introduced through European Directives 
96/92/EC, 2003/54/EC and 2009/72/EC (European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union, 1996; 2003; 2009). However, this liberalization has proved very 
much a work in progress: the market is still not operating in a fully liberalized way. 
We examine the journey taken from the previous monopolistic market setting to a 
liberalized form of market operation. We discuss the ways in which political agendas 
may influence decisions taken in the Greek electricity market and how this affects the 
efficiency of the market operation and has, up to now, blocked full liberalization.  
Section 2 discusses the limited existing research on the issue and describes the current 
electricity market setting. Section 3 outlines the standard reform model given in 
Littlechild (2006b) and uses this as a benchmark against which to compare the 
performance and the progress of the Greek electricity market reform. Section 4 
reflects on the problematic areas of this reform. Although Greece has achieved most 
of the Littlechild benchmarks, it falls down on a small number of crucial criteria. 
Section 5 concludes by identifying institutional factors that inhibit the evolution of 
electricity market reforms in Greece. 
 
2. Previous work 
There is a substantial literature on electricity market reform focusing primarily on the 
UK experience (See, for example Green and Newbery, 1997; Newbery, 2006; 
Newbery and Pollitt, 1997; and Pollitt, 2012). However, there is only a limited 
literature on the Greek electricity market since liberalization. Andrianesis et al. 
(2011), which describes the organization and the operation of the market, is the most 
relevant. However, it deals only with specific issues and not with the political 
economy of the Greek electricity market or the efficiency of its overall operation. 
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Iliadou (2009) outlines the evolution of the Greek electricity market from the start of 
the reform. It approaches the market transformation from a political economy 
perspective but differs from the present paper on two counts. First, it does not cover 
the most recent time period. Second, it has a legal focus and so does not investigate 
the incentives behind market changes. The present paper benchmarks the move to 
liberalization against a market reform model and investigates the extent to which this 
evolution is the result of a well-structured policy towards a new form of market 
organization in the electricity industry. 
Finally, there is very little research on electricity supply markets in general: the most 
notable work comes from Littlechild (1998; 2002; 2006a; 2009). Electricity supply 
markets seem to be the most difficult to liberalize and there is only a limited literature 
on their operation. As far as the Greek electricity supply market is concerned, the 
present paper provides an overview of its operation and of the problems that have 
occurred as it moves towards full liberalization. 
 
3. Benchmarking Greek electricity liberalisation 
The approach that we take is to benchmark the performance of the liberalized 
electricity industry in Greece against the standard model for electricity market reform 
as presented by Littlechild (2006b), who identifies 10 provisions for liberalisation.i 
Table 1 indicates the Greek electricity market’s progress against these provisions. 
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 3.1 “Vertical separation of competitive and regulated monopoly sectors to facilitate 
competition and regulation.” 
In the potentially competitive parts of the market, firms should be able to transfer any 
efficiency advantage to consumers through lower retail tariffs. This effort can be 
impeded by an established firm that also operates in the monopolist sectors of the 
market employing cross-subsidization, thereby creating market asymmetries. The 
sector unbundling also aids the regulator’s role in a number of ways. First, incentive 
regulation can be applied more easily and more straightforwardly to all parts of the 
market. Second, the regulator has the option of adopting different strategies for the 
regulation of each sector. Third, the identification of anti-competitive practices is 
facilitated. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the structural changes in the Greek electricity market 
accompanying liberalisation. The monopolistic firm, PPC, was initially split into two. 
One firm retained the name PPC and controlled the potentially competitive activities 
of the market (electricity generation and supply) as well as electricity distribution. 
The other firm was called the Hellenic Transmission System Operator (HTSO) 
(Journal of the Greek Government, 1999). This firm controlled and operated the 
electricity transmission system, held the daily electricity auctions and was also 
responsible for the operation of the wholesale electricity market.  
These two firms were both further split in 2011 with Law 4001/2011 resulting in four 
firms (Journal of the Greek Government, 2011). PPC has kept the competitive 
activities of the market (electricity generation and supply) and a new firm, Hellenic 
Electricity Distribution Network Operator (HEDNO), owns the electricity distribution 
network and is responsible for its operation. HTSO was also split in two firms. The 
Operator of Electricity Market (OOEM) operates the wholesale electricity market and 
the Independent Power Transmission Operator (IPTO) owns and operates the 
electricity transmission network. However, it is crucial to point out that the Greek 
government maintains effective ownership and control over these four firms. 
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3.2“Horizontal restructuring to create an adequate number of competing generators 
and suppliers.” 
The new liberalized market structure incorporates the notion of competition between 
the market players. In order for this to be effective, there should be an adequate 
number of market participants. However, this element of the market reform has been 
particularly difficult to achieve, especially as far as electricity retail supply is 
concerned. In 2010 there were 1,271 licensed electricity generators in the records of 
the Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE, 2010). By June 2013 the number had 
increased significantly. The number of licenced electricity generators using 
Renewable Energy Sources (RES) alone being 2,670 and the number of licences for 
hybrid power stations standing at 17 (RAE, 2013). Most of these are fringe firms, 
which have very limited generating capacity. There are, however, three independent 
firms (Elpedison, Heron, Mytilineos) that own 7 large natural-gas fired electricity 
generating plants. These are shown in Table 2. These generators, along with PPC and 
another two firms that own large electricity generator licences, Enelco and Motor Oil 
Hellas Korinthos Refineries, are the 9 generators that appear in the OOEM records 
(OOEM, 2013a).  
The independent electricity generators elect to build natural gas-fired stations. Whilst 
natural gas-fired units are a relatively cost-efficient solution, there are in fact few 
alternatives, given that lignite-fired units are owned and operated solely by PPC. This 
might be a problem as the market expansion in electricity generation will add only 
natural gas-fired and smaller new Renewable Energy Source-Electricity (RES-E) 
units. PPC has exclusive possession and control of lignite-fired units and large 
hydroelectric plants. This means that the state-owned company has access to very low 
cost electricity generation. This aids PPC in its retention of significant market power. 
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 Table 2: Greek Independent Natural Gas-Fired Generators. Sources: 
(Iliadou, 2009; RAE, 2010; OOEM, 2013a; DEPA, 2012; Motor Oil Hellas, 
2012; Elpedison, 2012) 
Owner 
Natural Gas Fired 
Independent Power 
Plants 
Licensed 
Generation 
Capacity (MW) 
Start of operation 
Elpedison Elpedison Thessaloniki 390.00 May 2005 
Elpedison Elpedison Thisvi 421.60 April 2010 
Heron  Heron I Thermoilektriki 187.46 Summer 2004 
Heron Heron II Viotias 435.00 January 2010 
Mytilineos Protergia 444.48 November 2010 
Mytilineos Korinthos Power 436.60 March 2012 
Mytilineos Alouminion 334.00 May 2008 
 
New independent suppliers have been reluctant to enter the Greek electricity market 
and serve all of the customer categories. Rather they have entered only those small 
segments of the market that are the most profitable. This situation has been sustained 
by the retail tariffs of PPC that, for certain customer categories, have been set at levels 
so low that competition would be impossible. These particular tariffs do not 
necessarily generate positive profits for the supplier. On the other hand, other 
customer categories faced higher retail electricity tariffs, which provide the 
opportunity for profits. These specific customer categories attracted entry from new 
suppliers. In the past, the policy of price-discrimination across different electricity 
consumers could be part of an income redistribution and indirect taxation policy. 
However, the transitionary period from the one market form to another has shown that 
such a policy is much harder to retain once there are new independent suppliers which 
compete for market share. 
19 electricity suppliers and 31 traders are registered in the records of the Operator of 
Electricity Market (OOEM, 2013b, 2013c). Of the 19 listed suppliers, 17 are 
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electricity firms and the other 2 are the “Supplier of Overall Service” and the 
“Supplier of Last Resort”. These last two roles are currently undertaken by PPC. The 
new suppliers have not developed business activity that covers all sections of the 
Greek electricity market but rather supply only selected profitable parts of the market, 
leaving all the other market segments to be covered by PPC. 
Little can be done about the fact that some parts of the market are more attractive than 
others, given the retail electricity tariffs that each customer category faces. But the 
regulator could attempt to introduce rules and regulations that ensure that firms 
participate in multiple market segments simultaneously. However such regulations 
can be bypassed by firms offering unattractive customer categories high tariffs that 
exceed those of the competition, which would lead to almost non-existent market 
penetration for these specific customer categories. So the issue is not to attempt to 
force electricity suppliers to serve the whole market, but rather to create a market 
setting that is attractive to independent suppliers. 
Regulated retail electricity tariffs have been a significant element of the market 
operation. These tariffs are adjusted by the decisions of the Minister responsible for 
the electricity sector and have an important role in shaping the electricity industry as a 
whole. The profit margins that retail tariffs produce for the market participants are a 
crucial determinant of the attractiveness of different market segments of the retail 
electricity supply. The alleged cross-subsidization between retail tariff categories that 
existed in the past has distorted the market and resulted in development of 
competition only in selected parts of it. This leaves the rest of the market to be served 
by PPC, which bears the obligation to serve the whole market. Such phenomena are 
being eliminated over time, since tariff restructuring took place at the beggining of 
both 2011 and 2012 (PPC, 2011a, 2012a-e). Retail tariffs are gradually being removed 
with the aim of reaching a full liberalization of tariffs that eliminates cross-
subsidizations and allows for competition to develop, assuming that there is no 
exercise of market power in the industry. 
However, progress is uncertain. In 2010 PPC was estimated to have a market share of 
95.6% in Greek retail electricity supply (RAE, 2012). In 2011 this fell to 92.3% but 
by 2012 it had risen to 98.5% (PPC, 2012f). It is evident that there is no clear progress 
to reducing this dominance of PPC in the Greek retail electricity supply market. 
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3.3 “Designation of an independent system operator to maintain network stability and 
facilitate competition.” 
A liberalized market requires an independent organization to ensure that the 
electricity network is operating properly and that the necessary market rules are in 
place. With Law 2773/1999, an independent system operator was initially introduced 
with the creation of the Hellenic Transmission System Operator (HTSO) (Journal of 
the Greek Government, 1999). This firm was simultaneously the wholesale market 
operator and the transmission system operator. Later in the reform process, with Law 
4001/2011, HTSO was split into two firms. These are the Operator Of Electricity 
Market (OOEM) which runs the wholesale electricity market and the Independent 
Power Transmission Operator (IPTO) which operates the electricity transmission 
network. These firms are owned by PPC but are set up to be independent from the 
mother-firm so that the market conditions remove any bias in the management and 
operation of the transmission system. The goal is to eliminate barriers to entry in the 
market and foster competition. 
 
3.4“Creation of voluntary energy and ancillary services markets and trading 
arrangements, including contract markets and real-time balancing of the system.” 
Given the complicated nature of the electricity industry, a series of arrangements are 
necessary in order for the market to operate and to provide a high standard of service. 
These requirements are the result of unique characteristics of electricity as a 
commodity. Electricity cannot be stored; its delivery is primarily via the grid; and the 
quality of service is related to continuous delivery within a specific voltage range 
which matches demand on a minute-by-minute basis. Given that after liberalization 
the market is served by a number of firms, appropriate trading arrangements turn out 
to be vital for market operations since without them coordination of the independent 
firms would be very difficult to achieve. Real-time balancing of the market and 
ancillary services is already in use in the Greek electricity industry. Contract markets 
have not been introduced up to this point, since generators and suppliers are not 
allowed to engage in bilateral transactions for electricity trading. The whole market 
operation passes through the electricity pool, which is mandatory for all generators 
and suppliers. 
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3.5“Application of regulatory rules to promote access to the transmission network 
and incentivize efficient location and interconnection of new generation facilities.” 
The transmission network is a natural monopoly which serves the firms that 
participate in the competitive parts of the market. Its operation should take into 
consideration all the market participants and ensure that all of them are given access 
to the transmission grid. Access prices to electricity transmission should be set in a 
way that encourages competition and new entry and also leads new entrants and new 
power plants to be efficiently located so as to optimize the performance of the whole 
industry. In Greece, regulation has been set in place to ensure that the conditions for 
the development of competition are met. Access to the transmission network is 
provided to all generators and suppliers and the introduction of new power plants 
takes place through central planning. Any new power plants entering the electricity 
system need to be approved and licensed by the market regulator. 
 
3.6“Unbundling of retail tariffs and rules to enable access to the distribution 
networks in order to promote competition at the retail level.” 
To enhance competition, the electricity suppliers should be competing on equal terms 
and in order for that to happen, retail tariffs should be unbundled. This means that 
there are separate charges for monopolistic and for competitive activities. Also, all 
suppliers should have equal access to the distribution network and be able to connect 
their customers to it. Greek retail electricity tariffs have been unbundled and the bills 
sent to consumers now separate the charges for the monopolistic activities (which are 
electricity transmission and distribution) and for the competitive activities (which 
comprise electricity generation and supply). In this way, the operation of the 
competitive elements of the market becomes more transparent. Access to the 
distribution networks is provided to all suppliers by the HEDNO. 
 
3.7“Specification of arrangements for supplying customers until retail competition is 
in place.” 
The transition from one form of market organization to another might include some 
periods of service disruption and/or of decreased service quality unless the necessary 
provisions are in place to prevent that. For this reason, some transitional arrangements 
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are likely to be required. Arrangements have been made to ensure that the electricity 
supply will not be interrupted in any way in the initial stages of market liberalization. 
PPC, being the previous incumbent electricity supplier, has been given the legal 
obligation to serve the whole electricity market and acts as supplier of last resort to 
cover for firms that are unable to supply their own customers. 
In January 2012, two large independent electricity suppliers (Energa and Hellas 
Power) lost their electricity supply licences due to financial difficulties, leaving a 
large part of their supply obligations uncovered (HTSO, 2012). This event 
demonstrates the weakness of the control and monitoring applied in the Greek 
electricity market. Being in transition from one market form to another, it was to be 
expected that not all the market mechanisms would be robust and rigorous. Finding 
two independent electricity suppliers in such a position and causing larger “spill-over” 
problems, has alarmed the market operator and the regulatory authority and stricter 
controls have been imposed. As a result, licences for other firms have also been 
suspended and the market operates under a much tighter framework (OOEM, 2012a, 
2012b). 
This event has highlighted the difficulty of regulating and monitoring an electricity 
market. The models for electricity market reform outline the steps that a market 
regulator can take to lead it towards liberalization (Littlechild, 2006b; Joskow, 2006; 
Joskow and Noll, 1999). However, these prescriptions are provided in a generic way 
and do not specify a detailed implementation process. This means that the 
introduction of market reforms remains a challenging task. Putting these “standard 
reform models” into practice requires technical, legal, accounting and economic 
solutions for a wide range of issues. These solutions are dependent on the specific 
economic, institutional, political and social framework as well as on the market 
organizations prior to the liberalization (Sioshansi, 2008a, 2008b). 
 
3.8“Creation of independent regulatory agencies with adequate information, staff and 
powers, and duties to implement incentive regulation and promote competition.” 
Liberalization needs an independent authority that is responsible for monitoring and 
controlling the market’s operation in order to protect the interests of the consumers 
and firms that participate in the market. At the same time, the regulator will be 
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enforcing incentive regulations in order to achieve efficiencies that can be transferred 
to the consumers.  
The Greek electricity market is regulated by the independent Regulatory Authority for 
Energy (RAE) that has a number of responsibilities with regards to the energy sectors 
in Greece. Law 2773/1999 created the RAE (Journal of the Greek Government, 1999) 
and Law 4001/2011 established its role and responsibilities, specifically around the 
areas of: participation in the long-run energy planning for Greece; security of supply; 
licencing for energy activities; infrastructure development and monitoring; tariff 
setting for non-competitive activities; monitoring distribution and transmission 
operators; certifying electricity firms; access to interconnections; monitoring energy 
markets; imposition of rules on the energy markets; protection of consumers; and 
energy market development (Journal of the Greek Government, 2011). However, on 
many occasions this regulatory authority has not been powerful enough to make 
important decisions regarding the energy sectors. Such decisions are mostly taken by 
the ministry that is responsible for energy issues, which is currently the Ministry of 
Environment, Energy and Climate Change. This regulatory arrangement renders 
decisions regarding the energy sectors in general and the electricity market in 
particular, still susceptible to political influences. 
 
3.9“Provision of transition mechanisms that anticipate and respond to problems and 
support the transition rather than hinder it.” 
The transition to the new market setting requires that specific problems that arise 
during that time are addressed so that the process is not stopped. Appropriate 
mechanisms have been used and adjustments made throughout the period of the Greek 
market reform. These have come through a structured approach, with the gradual 
introduction of market rules and their appropriate adjustment to serve the market and 
its evolution. Changes in the way that the Daily Dispatch Scheme is determined are 
introduced gradually and each major change in the market operation rules is identified 
by a “Reporting Day”. Each “Reporting Day” is thereby a step in the evolution of the 
market operation. 
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3.10“Privatization to enhance performance and reduce the ability of the state to use 
these enterprises to pursue costly political agendas.” 
The element of privatization is crucial in market reform. Privatized firms are more 
sensitive to efficiency and performance issues and the expectation is that the gains 
from this performance, under the pressure of competition, can be transferred to the 
market. At the same time, with privatization the ability of the State to use the 
electricity industry to serve political goal is severely reduced. 
In the past, Greek publicly-owned utilities have constituted an important tool in the 
hands of the government. This tool has been used in the delivery of a number of 
policies, which includes the operation of the electricity market to implement “social” 
policies through setting retail electricity tariffs at low levels. At present, the desire to 
fully liberalize the electricity industry appears to be very weak. We focus on four 
factors: the continuing high level of public ownership in the electricity industry; the 
role of the European Commission in the Greek electricity liberalization; the power of 
the PPC Workers Union; and the exclusive right that PPC has to generate electricity 
from lignite and the large hydroelectric plants.    
First, the Greek State is the owner of the majority of PPC shares (meaning that 
OOEM, HEDNO and IPTO are also under state control). It might be thought that 
PPC, being nominally a private firm, seeks to maximize value and profits. Given that 
PPC’s value is expected to be higher when it is a monopolist, the state’s majority 
shareholding immediately generates a potential tension in the government’s attempt to 
introduce competition. However, as we note in Section 3.2, profit and value 
maximization are not necessarily the main objective for a state-controlled PPC. Rather 
the importance of PPC’s ownership and governance status is rather that PPC typically 
does not act in the way that an independent monopolist would. In particular, the 
government can use PPC as an instrument of income redistribution, but this implies 
that tariffs are applied at such a low level that new entrants would find the market 
unattractive. In that case, the ownership of PPC acts as an obstacle to the market 
evolution and to the introduction of competition. In order for the state to achieve 
market liberalization, whilst maintaining ownership of the incumbent firm, it has to 
resist the temptation of utilizing PPC for political, rather than commercial, aims. 
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Second, as outlined in the introduction, Greece initiated electricity market 
liberalization as a result of EU directives. Unlike, say, the UK, liberalization was not 
driven by a domestic political agenda. Therefore there might be less genuine 
enthusiasm for its rapid implementation.  
Third, publicly owned firms, PPC amongst them, have formed strong workers’ unions 
and Greek political parties have developed affiliations with these unions. The 
negotiating strength of the PPC Union of Workers is supported by their ability to shut 
down the Greek electricity system (PPC, 2011b). The interests of the PPC workers, as 
expressed by their Union, are not aligned with the EU liberalizing agenda in Greek 
electricity generation and supply. Having powerful unions on one side and the EU 
requirements on the other, Greek governments have proved reluctant to proceed 
decisively in either direction. They do not wish to lose any political capital. But this 
does not mean that they pursue a middle-ground solution. Rather it means that no 
steps are taken in any direction, thereby postponing the reforms for some future time. 
This significantly slows down the market reform process. 
Fourth, in Greek electricity generation, new entrants are currently only employing 
natural gas fired power plants or new RES-E units. The use of lignite as a fuel for 
thermal power plants and the ownership and control of large hydroelectric units 
remains with PPC. This asymmetry is inherited from to the previous monopolistic 
market structure of the electricity generation sector. The political forces within the 
country must decide whether access to lignite and to large hydroelectric units is to be 
given to the rest of the market players, thereby further opening up the market and 
encouraging competition, The sale or rental of existing lignite or large hydroelectric 
plants, or allowing the construction of similar plants by new entrants are possible 
policy options.  
 
4. The Littlechild model revisited 
It appears that at least seven out of the ten provisions of the Littlechild model have 
been fully met in Greece, so that one might think that the electricity industry is close 
to successful liberalization. However at present a large part of the Greek electricity 
market is not attracting new entrants, implying that the liberalization is severely 
limited. It is clear that the ten requirements of the Littlechild model do not all have the 
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same status. This is represented in Figure 3, where the problematic requirements 2, 8 
and 10 from the Littlechild model (as indicated in Table 1) are shown in a framework 
that also includes the rest of the requirements. 
First, requirement 10, which refers to the willingness of politicians to give up control 
of the electricity sector, is the crucial motivating one. The willingness to proceed with 
the reform should be the starting point and the guiding force for the implementation of 
the liberalization process. The political will to support the market reform is critical. 
Second, requirement 2, the creation of an adequate number of competing generators 
and suppliers, is a measure of the success of the market reform. That is to say, it is an 
outcome of the liberalization process, and not an enabling step. The fact that this 
requirement has not been fully met implies that the liberalization process is at present 
not succeeding in Greece.  
Third, the remaining eight requirements act in a facilitating manner. However, of 
these facilitating factors, requirement 8, the creation of an independent regulator, 
plays a central role. Meeting this requirement in full would imply that requirement 10 
is also met (at least in part). This is because a fully independent regulator would shift 
control of the electricity industry away from direct political influence. However, as in 
Greece, choosing to meet requirement 8 in a way that does not actually give the 
regulator control of the market is a stance that allows political forces to comply with 
the letter, but not the spirit, of the Littlechild approach.  
The State has extensive control over the regulatory authority. In addition, important 
electricity market decisions are taken by the Ministry of Environment, Energy and 
Climate Change. The Greek electricity market is therefore still strongly influenced by 
the State. The State can impose controls and restrictions through its market-regulating 
role. But it can also shape important decisions by using its ownership of PPC and the 
firms that PPC controls. Liberalization explicitly means that direct state control is lost. 
A lack of progress in the three benchmarks of the Littlechild model which Greece is 
not presently meeting appears to have circumscribed the process of electricity 
industry reform. 
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Requirement 10: Willingness to reform
Requirement 8: Independence and 
powers of the market regulator. Not 
fully met in the Greek case.
Requirement 2: Number of firms in the market, 
largely being an outcome of the market reform. 
Not met to an adequate extent in the Greek case.
Figure 3
The Littlechild requirements and their relationship in the Greek 
case (numbering of the requirements is consistent with Table 1)
Requirements that are already met 
in the Greek case: 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9
 
Under the argument that political forces are failing to support market liberalization, 
there may be some very specific reasons in the Greek case as to why the reform 
process and the change in the electricity sector are occurring so slowly. One is the 
general economic climate in Greece with the economy currently in a major recession 
which began in 2010 (Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011; Featherstone, 2011; Zahariadis, 
2012; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012). The suggestion that the economic recession 
could have impacted the electricity reforms is very credible. In this very negative 
economic climate, radically reduced liquidity in the banking system has reduced the 
ability of firms to use debt to fund their activities because bank credit is not widely 
available. Also, where credit is available, interest rates are higher than they would 
have been without the crisis, since the ability of the banks themselves to borrow 
money has been undermined and they have to pay higher risk premiums to their own 
lenders. Additionally, the reduced income amongst the wider population means that 
any potential new electricity supplier faces a higher risk of bad debt. Other sources of 
concern for potential investors during the Greek recession relate to taxation as well as 
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exchange rate risks. The joint occurrence of these risks makes for a very unattractive 
market setting, which does nothing to encourage new entrants to the market. 
The political positions that are adopted in Greece, in combination with the current 
negative economic climate that Greece faces, suggests two possible explanations for 
the slow rate of electricity liberalization in Greece. Either Greek policymakers do not 
wish electricity market liberalization to occur; or they wish it to proceed but are 
hindered by the current recession. In the former case, a more fundamental issue arises. 
This is where countries that constitute part of the European Union do not align their 
policies and agendas with those of the EU as a whole. However, whichever of the two 
explanations actually applies, successful implementation will require a major change 
in the overall stance taken by Greek governments in completely committing to 
liberalization and the full implementation of the remaining Littlechild criteria. 
   
5. Conclusions 
Progress has been made on market reform in the Greek electricity industry but much 
more needs to be done. The prime motivation behind this reform comes from the 
European Union, but it is left to Greek governments to implement. There are bound to 
be some setbacks and adjustments that need to be made as liberalization is 
implemented. Although seven of the ten Littlechild benchmarks have already been 
met, some of these benchmarks are much more significant than others and it is these 
key benchmarks that are at present missing in Greek electricity market liberalization. 
In particular, the Greek state faces conflicting agendas as it tries to liberalize the 
market whilst retaining ownership of the previous monopoly provider. The position of 
the State is compromised as it attempts to adopt liberal practices but at the same time 
maintains and preserves state ownership in significant parts of the economy. 
Greek governments are generally reluctant to proceed on any radical reforms that 
involve a loss of political capital. Political parties in government are called upon to 
serve multiple agendas and some social agendas are met through imposing 
appropriate electricity retail tariffs. But such policies can halt progress on market 
reform that otherwise would be made. Cross-subsidization makes it very hard for 
entrant firms to compete in some tariff categories in electricity supply. This 
discourages the horizontal development of competition in the retail electricity supply 
-19- 
 
market. Additionally the negative economic climate generated by the current 
recession in Greece is likely to have an adverse effect on the electricity market reform 
process. For the Greek government to successfully implement electricity liberalization 
it needs both to address the required elements of this reform and to simultaneously 
deal with the current financial crisis. 
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 FOOTNOTES 
 
i
 Other approaches provide similar prescriptions concerning liberalization (Joskow and 
Noll, 1999; Joskow, 2006). Reform models do differ but their policy, rather than 
detailed technical, focus means that their implementation is left for the policymaker to 
determine. For any given policymaker, following any of the various reform models is 
likely to lead to a similar outcome. 
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